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AVIATION NOISE ABATEMENT: FEDERAL
CONTROL BUT LOCAL LIABILITY?
Courts traditionally reconize that loud or objectionable noises
may constitute a nuisance. Aviation noise has been a plentiful
source of such nuisances, creating a seemingly endless flow of litiga-
tion.2 While federal laws3 preempt 4 several aspects of aviation noise
control, local and state authorities have nevertheless tried to enact
ordinances and regulations designed to abate aircraft noise.5 In addi-
tion, individuals adversely affected by aircraft noise have turned to
the courts for relief.6 The extent of federal preemption in the field of
1. E.g., Hooks v. International Speedways, Inc., 263 N.C. 686, 140 S.E.2d 387
(1965) (drag racing); Kramer v. Sweet, 179 Or. 324, 169 P.2d 892 (1946) (slaughter-
house); Seastream v. N.J. Exhibition Co., 67 N.J. Eq. 178, 58 A.532 (1904) (Sunday
baseball). See generally, W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 583-84 (4th
ed. 1971); Lloyd, Noise as a Nuisance, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 567 (1934); Spater, Noise and
the Law, 63 MICH. L. REV. 1373 (1965).
2. The first reported aircraft nuisance case is Smith v. New Eng. Aircraft Co., 270
Mass. 511, 170 N.E. 385 (1930) (refusing to enjoin flights over plaintiffs property
absent showing of damages). For a survey of the early cases, see Lesser, The Aircraft
Noise Problem: Federal Power but Local Liability, 3 URB. LAW. 175 (1971); Munro,
Aircraft Noise as a Taking of Property, 13 N.Y.L.F. 476 (1967).
3. The Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1976); The Noise Control
Act of 1972, 49 U.S.C. § 1431 (1976). For further discussion, see notes 15-21 and
accompanying text infra.
4. For a general discussion of the concept and application of the preemption doc-
trine, see Note, The Preemption Doctrine.- Shifting Perspectives, 75 COLUM. L. REV.
623 (1975); Note, Preemption as a Preferential Ground- A New Canon of Construction,
12 STAN. L. REV. 208 (1959).
5. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. 473.216 (1976) (empowering the metropolitan council to
determine and establish acceptable noise levels for the operation of aircraft and to
create aircraft noise zones to assure compatible land use in the vicinity of airports);
WASH. REV. CODE § 53.54.010 (1979) (authorizing the port commission to adopt a
program of noise impact abatement through land management, mortgage insurance
provisions, and soundproofing of structures within the area surrounding the airport).
Other common actions include night-time operating restrictions, the establishment of
noise preferential runway systems, and the exclusion of particular types of aircraft.
For a summary of the types of actions taken by state and local authorities, see U.S.
DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, AVIATION NOISE ABATEMENT POLICY 21 (November 18,
1976).
6. Plaintiffs most often base their claims on a taking theory. They contend that
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aviation noise abatement, as well as the range of remedial devices
available to injured litigants, remains unclear, however.7 Signifi-
cantly, the California Supreme Court in Greater Westchester Home-
owner's Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles,8 recently held that federal
preemption does not bar a nuisance action against a city-owned air-
port for personal injuries sustained as a result of noise from aircraft
using the facility.9
the airport owner, by invading the plaintiffs airspace, has taken that property for
public use. See, e.g., Griggs v. County of Allegheny, Pa., 369 U.S. 84 (1962) (airport
operator liable to property owner when direct overflights rendered the property unde-
sirable for residential use); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (U.S., as
lessee of airport and operator of low flying military planes over plaintiff's property,
liable for invasion of that property); Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir.
1962) (no taking of property in the absence of a direct overflight). But V/. Thornburg
v. Port of Portland, 233 Or. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962) (no need to show direct over-
flight when evidence indicates substantial interference with the use and enjoyment of
land); Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 309, 391 P.2d 540 (1964) (plaintiff not
required to show substantial interference with use of property if market value has
sharply declined).
Plaintiffs basing their claims on a nuisance theory generally have been less success-
ful. The doctrine of "legalized nuisance" usually precludes recovery. E.g., City of
Newark v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 750 (D.N.J. 1958) (suit to enjoin
flights and recover damages for nuisance dismissed because of exclusive federal con-
trol of air commerce); Loma Portal Civic Club v. American Airlines, Inc., 61 Cal. 2d
582, 394 P.2d 548, 39 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1964) (injunction not available to restrict aircraft
operations that comply with federal and state laws and in furtherance of the public
interest). But Cf Township of Hanover v. Town of Morristown, 108 N.J. Super. 461,
261 A.2d 692 (1969) (injunction issued limiting the hours of operation of aprivate
airport that did not accommodate public flights). For further discussion, see Note,
Airplane Noise: Problem in Tort Law and Federalism, 74 HARv. L. REV. 1581 (1961).
7. Compare City of Blue Ash v. McLucas, 596 F.2d 709 (6th Cir. 1979) (airport
proprietor has power to establish permissible noise levels at municipal airport), with
Luedtke v. County of Milwaukee, 521 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1975) (federal legislation has
occupied the field of aircraft noise control). For further discussion, see notes 41-58
and accompanying text infra. See generally, HILDEBRAND, NOISE POLLUTION AND
THE LAW (1970); Fadem and Berger, A Nosy Airport is a Damned Nuisance, 3 S.W.
UNIv. L. REv. 39 (1971); Muss, Aircraft Noise: Federal Pre-emption of Local Control,
Concorde and Other Recent Cases, 43 J. AIR. L. & CoM. 753 (1977); Note, Aircraft
Noise Abatement: Is There Roomfor Local Regulation?, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 269
(1975); Comment, Noise Pollution: Attempted Federal Control ofAirplane Noise, 18
NAT. RESOURCES J. 621 (1978); Note, Shfting Aircraft Noise Liability to the Federal
Government, 61 VA. L. REV. 1299 (1975).
8. 26 Cal. 3d 86, 603 P.2d 1329, 160 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
933 (1980).
9. Id. In addition to sustaining the plaintiffs' nuisance action, the court permitted
the recovery of damages for a taking of their property. See note 6, supra. The inverse
condemnation remedy is well established in aviation noise cases and was not even
discussed in the opinion. Therefore, this comment will not analyze inverse condemna-
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In Greater Westchester, a group of owners and occupants of homes
located near municipally owned Los Angeles International Airport
(LAX) sued the city on a nuisance theory. 10 Plaintiffs sought to re-
cover damages for personal injuries" emanating from the arrivals
and departures of jet aircraft at LAX. The city contended that fed-
eral legislation occupied the field of aviation noise reduction and thus
rendered the city powerless to control such noise. 12 Relying on the
proprietor exception to federal preemption provided by the United
States Supreme Court in City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal,
Inc. ,13 the court analyzed the city's duties and powers as proprietor
of LAX and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.' 4
tion. See cases cited in note 6 spra; Russell, Recent Developments in Inverse Condem-
nation of Airspace, 39 J. AIR. L. & COM. 81 (1973); Stoebuck, Condemnation by
Nuisance: The 4irport Cases in Retrospect andProspect, 71 DICK. L. REV. 207 (1967);
Van Alstyne, Just Compensation ofIntangible Detriment: Criteria/or Legislative Modi-
fications in California, 16 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 491 (1969).
10. In this context. the court defined nuisance as anything injurious to health,
annoying to the senses, or detrimental to the use of property, "so as to interfere with
the comfortable enjoyment of life or property." Greater Westchester Homeowner's
Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles, 26 Cal. 3d 86, 98, 603 P.2d 1329, 1335, 160 Cal. Rptr.
733, 738 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 933 (1980).
11. Id. at 91, 603 P.2d at 1330, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 734. The California Supreme
Court accepted the trial court's factual findings regarding the effects of the noise cre-
ated by jet aircraft using LAX. The noise disrupted personal communication in the
home, as well as telephone conversations and television reception; impeded the plain-
tiffs' ability to utilize the outside portions of their property; frequently prevented
sleep; and interfered with the ability of students to study in their homes. Id. at 92, 603
P.2d at 1331, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 734.
12. Id. at 93, 603 P.2d at 1331, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 735. This comment focuses on
the federal preemption argument raised by the city. The city also raised a state law
defense, however. The city claimed that CAL. CIVIL CODE § 3482 (Deering), provid-
ing that an act expressly authorized by statute cannot constitute a nuisance, rendered
the city immune from nuisance liability. The court rejected the city's argument, rea-
soning that statutes that broadly authorize and regulate airports and aircraft flights do
not necessarily endorse their maintenance as a nuisance. Id. at 101, 603 P.2d 1329 at
1337, 160 Cal. Rptr. 733 at 740.
13. 411 U.S. 624 (1973). See notes 28-34 and accompanying text infra.
14. 26 Cal. 3d 86, 100, 603 P.2d 1329, 1336, 160 Cal. Rptr. 733, 739 (1979). The
court awarded damages in the aggregate amount of $86,000 for personal injuries. It
did, however, reverse the court of appeals' postjudgment order awarding prejudgment
interest. Acknowledging the speculative nature of any award for emotional and
mental distress, the court asserted that granting retrospective interest to such an
award would combine conjecture with speculation. The court also reversed the lower
court's assessment of attorney's fees and remanded the case on that issue. Id. at 102-
04, 603 P.2d at 1337-38, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 741-42.
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The Federal Aviation Act 5 is the foundation of an extensive fed-
eral scheme regulating air commerce and transportation. The Act de-
clares that the United States has full and exclusive dominion over the
nation's airspace.' 6 Although the original Act did not refer to noise
control, 7 Congress added an aircraft noise abatement amendment in
1968.18 Partly out of dissatisfaction with the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration's implementation of that enactment,19 Congress passed
the Noise Control Act of 1972.20 The Act provided for joint FAA
and Environmental Protection Agency regulation of aircraft noise
and sonic boom.2
1
The legislative histories of the 1968 and 1972 enactments reveal the
scope of federal preemption intended by Congress. 22 The Senate
Commerce Committee Report endorsing the 1968 amendment indi-
cated that the amendment preempted state and local governments
15. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1976).
16. Id. at § 1508. The Act broadly empowers the Federal Aviation Administrator
to develop and promulgate regulations to insure the efficient utilization of that air-
space. Id. at § 1348(a). Specifically, the Administrator has the authority to control
aircraft takeoffs, landings, navigation, and air traffic rules. .d. at § 1348.
17. This omission did not prevent the Administrator from issuing noise abatement
regulations. Occasionally, as part of his responsibility to protect persons and property
on the ground, he prescribed noise reduction regulations. Id. at § 1348(c). See, e.g.,
28 FED. REG. 15,422 (1967); 14 C.F.R. 60 (1963); 25 FED. REG. 1767 (1960).
18. Act of July 21, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-411, 82 Stat. 395 (codified at 49 U.S.C.
§ 1431(b) (1976)). The amendment expressly directs the Administrator to promulgate
standards for the measurement and control of aircraft noise and sonic boom, so as to
afford present and future relief from such noise. The amendment enumerates several
considerations designed to guide the Administrator. Among these are the technologi-
cal and economic feasibility of attaining a proposed standard, the need to assure a
high degree of safety, and the broad goal of promoting the public interest. Id.
§ 1431(d).
19. See, e.g., Muss, Aircraft Noise: Federal Preemption f/Local Control, Concorde
and Other Recent Cases, 43 J. AIR L. & COM. 753, 773 (1977); Note, Shoing Aircraft
Noise Liability to the Federal Government, 61 VA. L. REV. 1299, 1319 (1975). The
FAA acknowledged that congressional dissatisfaction with its "methodical regulatory
practice" led to the passage of the 1972 Act. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, AvIA-
TION NOISE ABATEMENT POLICY 30 (November 18, 1976).
20. Noise Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-574, 86 Stat. 1234 (codified at 49
U.S.C. § 1431 (1976)).
21. Id. at § 1431(c)(1). The Act authorized the Administrator of the EPA to con-
duct a strdy of the adequacy of FAA noise controls and standards. Upon completion
of that study, the EPA had to submit proposed regulations to the FAA. After consid-
eration of those regulations and further consultation with the EPA, the FAA could
finally prescribe and amend noise reduction regulations. Id.
22. See notes 23-27 and accompanying text infra.
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from exercising their police powers to abate aircraft noise.2 3 Simi-
larly, the report of the Senate Committee on Public Works, the com-
mittee that directed the passage of the Noise Control Act of 1972,
provided that the Act would not alter the relationship between the
federal, state, and local governments.24
The scope of federal preemption, however, is not as absolute as it
may first appear. The Committee Reports for both the 1968 and 1972
enactments suggest that Congress did not intend to limit the power of
a state or municipal airport proprietor to control or regulate aircraft
noise.25 Thus, although Congress preempted the exercise of state and
local police power in the field of aircraft noise regulation,26 it did not
restrict the powers of a governmental airport proprietor.27
In City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc. ,28 the Supreme
Court examined the amended federal legislation.29 Plaintiffs chal-
lenged the validity of a municipal ordinance that placed an II p.m. to
7 a.m. moratorium on ffight operations at the privately owned
23. The committee report declared that the amendment would merely expand
federal power in an area already occupied by the federal government. According to
the report, federal legislation would continue to preempt state and local governments
from exercising their police powers to control aircraft noise by regulating aircraft in
flight. S. REP. No. 1353, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1968), reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2688, 2694.
24. The report expressly provided that the Act preserved the status quo regarding
the relationship between federal, state, and local governmental authority. S. REP. No.
92-1160, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1972), reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 4655, 4663.
25. The Senate Report that accompanied the 1968 noise abatement amendment
quoted approvingly a letter from Secretary of Transportation Alan Boyd. The letter
specifically stated that Congress did not design the legislation to curtail the powers of
state or local governmental airport proprietors. The rights of an airport proprietor to
promulgate regulations establishing permissible noise levels, and to exclude aircraft
which fail to meet those levels, remained intact. The report concluded that Congress
did not intend to substitute its judgment for that of the state or local airport proprie-
tor. S. REP. No. 1353, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1968), reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws, 2688, 2694.
The Senate Report endorsing the 1972 Noise Control Act expressly declared that its
provisions in no way limited the responsibilities and powers of airport proprietors. S.
REP. No. 92-1160, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1972), reprintedin [1972] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS. 4655,4663.
26. See notes 23-24 and accompanying text supra.
27. See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
28. 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
29. See notes 15-21 and accomanying text supra.
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Hollywood-Burbank Airport. ° Invoking the standards for preemp-
tion articulated in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp. , Justice Douglas,
writing for the Court, emphasized the comprehensiveness of both the
Federal Aviation Act and the amendments provided by the Noise
Control Act of 1972.32 He concluded that the pervasive federal
scheme preempted the field of aircraft noise regulation."3 The Court,
however, specifically limited its holding to those attempts by state
and local governments to control aircraft noise by exercising their
police power. The Court did not address the limitations, if any, that
apply to a municipality in its capacity as airport proprietor.34
30. 411 U.S. at 625-26. Although the Hollywood-Burbank Airport accommodates
public flights, it is privately owned. Significantly, Burbank did not involve a regula-
tion imposed by a governmental airport proprietor.
31. 331 U.S. 218 (1947). In Rice, the Supreme Court asserted that the intent to
preempt exists when: 1) the scheme of federal regulation so fully occupies the field as
to reasonably establish an inference that Congress intended to leave no room for sup-
plementary state action; or 2) the legislation regulates a subject matter in which the
federal stake is so dominant, compared to state interests, that the federal scheme is
assumed to bar state action on the same subject; or 3) the state legislation is directly
inconsistent with the goals of the federal legislation. Id. at 230.
32. 411 U.S. at 632-33. Justice Douglas acknowledged the significance of the tem-
poral sequence involved. He noted that the parties filed their complaint and the dis-
trict court entered its judgment before the enactment of the Noise Control Act of
1972. The Court avoided charges of retrospective application of the Act, however, by
concluding that the 1972 Act merely "reaffirmed" and "reinforced" existing federal
control over aircraft noise. Id. at 633.
33. Id. The Court concluded that the FAA, in concert with the EPA, has exclu-
sive control over aircraft noise, preempting state and local regulation.
34. Id. at 635-36. In a highly influential footnote, Justice Douglas quoted seg-
ments from the letter written by Secretary of Transportation Boyd. The excerpts
stated that the amendment to the Federal Aviation Act did not curtail the powers of
airport proprietors. See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
Justice Douglas then observed,
...[W]e are concerned here not with an ordinance imposed by the City of Bur-
bank as 'proprietor' of the airport, but with the exercise of police power...
[A]uthority that a municipality may have as a landlord is not necessarily congru-
ent with its police power. We do not consider here what limits, if any, apply to a
municipality as a proprietor.
Id. at 635-36, n.14.
In dissent, Justice Rehnquist criticized the police power/proprietary power distinc-
tion. He noted that the Hollywood-Burbank Airport is one of the few airports in the
country that services federally certified air carriers but which is not owned by a gov-
ernmental unit. "It simply strains credulity," he concluded, "[that]. . .Congress in-
tended that all airports save the Hollywood-Burbank Airport could enact curfews."
Id. at 652-53 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 22:301
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Although the result in Burbank was not novel,3" the Court's rea-
soning is significant. The Supreme Court based its decision totally on
preemption of state police power. By failing to address other strong
arguments, 6 the Court left a host of issues unanswered. The curfew
in Burbank affected only one scheduled flight per week, which inci-
dentally was intrastate.37 The district court found the curfew vio-
lated the interstate commerce clause;38 the Supreme Court skirted
this issue.39 Also, Burbank's language and rationale suggest that fed-
eral legislation has completely preempted the field of aircraft noise
abatement. In fact, the decision only precludes actions by a munici-
pality that does not own or operate its airport.4 °
35. Burbank was not the first decision invalidating a local ordinance which at-
tempted to control aircraft noise. In American Airlines v. Town of Hempstead, 272
F. Supp. 226 (E.D.N.Y. 1967), af'd, 398 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1017 (1969) and Allegheny Airlines v. Village of Cedarhurst, 132 F. Supp. 871
(E.D.N.Y. 1955), af'd 238 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1956), the Second Circuit struck down
attempts by residents of communities adjoining what is now Kennedy Airport to
regulate flights through their respective communities. In Hempstead, the court con-
cluded that the ordinance and federal lay were in direct conflict. Cedarhurst invali-
dated a minimum altitude ordinance, reasoning that federal preemption was essential
to promote safety. American Airlines, Inc. v. City of Audubon Park, 297 F. Supp. 207
(W.D. Ky. 1968), aft'd, 407 F.2d 1306 (6th Cir. 1969), advanced a third rationale. The
court invalidated the city's minimum altitude ordinance as an intolerable and undue
burden on interstate commerce. Id.
36. See cases discussed at note 35 supra.
37, City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. at 626. The only
regularly scheduled commercial flight affected by the curfew was a Hollywood-Bur-
bank stopover on a Pacific Southwest Airlines run from Oakland to San Diego every
Sunday night.
38. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc. v. City of Burbank, 318 F. Supp. 914, 927 (C.D.
Cal. 1970). The district court feared the effect similar curfews would have if enacted
by many municipalities. The court predicted national proliferation of such ordi-
nances, and opined that "a serious loss of efficiency to the use of airspace" would
result. In addition, scheduling difficulties would abound along with the disruption of
passengers and goods. Id.
39. It is unclear whether the Supreme Court would have invalidated the ordi-
nance on commerce clause grounds. The fact that the ordinance only eliminated an
intrastate flight does not insulate that flight from congressional regulation. The "af-
fectation" doctrine allows Congress to regulate intrastate activity that directly affects
interstate commerce. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1
(1937). Four dissenting justices discussed the issue. They agreed, however, that the
impact of the Burbank ordinance was not an unreasonable burden on interstate com-
merce. 411 U.S. at 654 (Rehnquist, I., dissenting).
40. See note 34 and accompanying text supra.
The 6th Circuit recently noted that 475 airports are currently certified by the FAA
to serve the United States and its possessions. Of that total, only two are not main-
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In the aftermath of Burbank, courts have disagreed on the scope of
the proprietor exception and its impact on the tort liability of air-
ports.41 Some courts4z have virtually ignored the exception, giving
no substance to the proprietor's power and responsibility.43 The Dis-
trict Court of Northern California took a more moderate position in
A r Transport Ass'n ofAmerica v. Crotti.4  That case tested the valid-
ity of California regulations45 requiring airport proprietors to meet
specified noise standards.46 The court held that proprietors may reg-
ulate and control ground noise but may not regulate aircraft in direct
flight.47
Several courts48 have seized upon the Burbank Court's specific re-
fusal to limit the authority of a governmental airport proprietor,49
tained by governmental units, the Hollywood-Burbank Airport and the heliport atop
the Pan American Building in New York City. Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598
F.2d 1033, 1038 (6th Cir. 1979). The Burbank Court's failure to address the proprie-
tor exception suggests that its holding applies only to those two privately owned
airports.
41. Greater Westchester Homeowner's Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles, 26 Cal. 3d
86, 96, 603 P.2d 1329, 1333-34, 160 Cal. Rptr. 733, 737 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
933 (1980).
42. See, e.g., County of Cook v. Priester, 22 Il. App. 3d 965, 318 N.E.2d 327
(1974) (county's attempts to impose weight restrictions at airport held invalid).
43. See, e.g., Luedtke v. County of Milwaukee, 521 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1975)
(county operating airport held immune from liability for noise emanating from the
airport provided it complied with federal laws; federal control in this area deemed
exclusive). Although the court relied on Burbank, it completely disregarded the pro-
prietor exception.
44. 389 F. Supp. 58 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
45. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 21669-69.4 (1970).
46. 389 F. Supp. at 62. The standards fell into two categories. One established
maximum levels of airport noise to which communities could be exposed. The other
established maximum noise levels for aircraft directly engaged in flight. Id.
47. Id. at 65. The court found the ground noise measures innocuous to aircraft
traffic and in no way offensive to the federal regulation of air commerce. It rejected
the provisions regulating noise levels of aircraft in flight, however, as unlawful intru-
sions into an area exclusively governed by federal law. Id. Accord, San Diego Uni-
fied Port Dist. v. Superior Court, 67 Cal. App. 3d 361, 136 Cal. Rptr. 557 (1977)
(airport proprietor may properly regulate ground and facilities use but federal pre-
emption precludes proprietary regulation of aircraft in flight).
48. See, e.g., City of Blue Ash v. McLucas, 596 F.2d 709 (6th Cir. 1979) (federal
preemption does not preclude right of airport proprietors to set permissible noise
standards); Parker v. City of Los Angeles, 44 Cal. App. 3d 556, 118 Cal. Rptr. 687
(1975) (preemption argument rejected as defense in inverse condemnation proceed-
ings against municipal proprietor).
49. See notes 28-34 and accompanying text supra.
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and the reasoning articulated in Griggs v. County of ,4llegheny, Pa..5o
These courts have expressed a broader interpretation of proprietary
power. Decisions upholding the Port Authority of New York's power
to ban flights of the Concorde supersonic transport5 illustrate this
approach. The Second Circuit noted that traditional inverse con-
demnation law makes the proprietor liable for having insufficient air
easements.5 As a corollary to this principle, the court concluded that
a proprietor may limit its liability by restricting the use of its
airport. 5
3
A similarly broad view of proprietary power surfaced in National
Aviation v. City of Hayward.5 4 The facts were essentially identical to
those in Burbank," except that the city that enacted the curfew
owned the airport. The district court focused on the legislative histo-
ries of the 1968 and 1972 noise-related enactments,5 emphasizing
Justice Douglas' deference to them in Burbank. 7 It concluded that
the federal legislation did not preempt noise reduction measures by
50. 369 U.S. 84 (1962) (successful inverse condemnation action against airport
proprietor when noise from aircraft overflights rendered plaintiffs property undesir-
able for residential use). See note 6 supra. Griggs is especially significant because it
clarified the reasons for imposing liability upon the proprietor. The Court noted that
the proprietor had promoted and designed the airport including the location and run-
way direction. The Court observed that it was the proprietor's responsibility to obtain
the land necessary for the airport's operation. It ultimately found that the proprietor
had not acquired sufficient easements. 369 U.S. at 89. For a scholarly discussion of
Griggs, see Hill, Liabilityfor Aircraft Noise.- The ,4ftermath of Causby and Griggs, 19
U. MIAMI L. REv. 1 (1964).
51. British Airways Bd. v. Port Auth. of N.Y., 431 F. Supp. 1216 (S.D.N.Y. 1977),
rey'd, 558 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1977), on remnand, 437 F. Supp. 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), modi-
fied, 564 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1977).
52. Griggs v. County of Allegheny, 369 U.S. 84 (1962) and progeny support this
proposition. See notes 6 and 50, supra.
53. 558 F.2d at 83. The court required only that the Port Authority's regulations
be reasonable, nonarbitrary, and nondiscriminatory. It thus deferred to the Port Au-
thority's knowledge of the surrounding community. This intimate knowledge of local
conditions qualified the proprietor to effectively confront the problem of noise reduc-
tion. Id. at 83, 564 F.2d at 1011.
54. 418 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
55. See notes 28-34 and accompanying text supra.
56. See notes 15-27 and accompanying text supra. The court reprinted the much-
quoted letter from Secretary of Transportation Boyd. See notes 25-27 and 34 and
accompanying text supra. The Hayward court accurately described the letter as a
critical item of legislative history upon which the Supreme Court based its opinion in
Burbank. 418 F. Supp. at 420-21.
57. See notes 31-34 and accompanying text supra.
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municipal proprietors.5 8
While courts were struggling to define the scope of proprietary
power, the FAA and Department of Transportation released a joint
monograph59 endorsing a broad role for airport operators in noise
control.6" The FAA expressly rejected exclusive federal control of
aviation noise abatement.61 Instead, it imposed upon the airport pro-
prietor the primary responsibility for reducing the effect of noise on
surrounding residents.62 The FAA reaffirmed this position in 1978.63
In Greater Westchester, the California Supreme Court adopted an
58. 418 F. Supp. at 424-25. Chief Judge Peckham, writing for the court, acknowl-
edged that the court found itself "caught on the horns of a sharp dilemma." The
dilemma involved a resolution of the conflicting positions presented by the Burbank
Court. Judge Peckham reasoned:
If on one hand, we follow the dicta in footnote 14 of the Burbank opinion, which
is intended to comport with the Court's holding in Griggs, we will severely un-
dercut the rationale of Burbank's finding of preemption. If on the other hand, we
disregard the proprietor exception as dicta in order to fully effectuate the Bur-
bank rationale, we impose upon airport proprietors the responsibility under
Griggs for obtaining the requisite noise easements, yet deny them the authority
to control the level of noise produced at their airports.
Id.
The court finally resolved the issue on the basis of "[a] clear Congressional state-
ment" that the federal legislation did not prevent airport proprietors from restricting
use of their airports due to noise considerations. Id.
59. U.S. DEe'T OF TRANSPORTATION, AVIATION NOISE ABATEMENT POLICY (No-
vember 18, 1976).
60. Id. at 5. The FAA emphasized that cooperation among federal, state and
local governments, and airport proprietors would be necessary to combat the aviation
noise problem. Id.
61. Id. at 34, 49. The FAA acknowledged that it had refused to undertake full
and exclusive control of aviation noise regulation. Citing the wide variety of airports
and the communities they serve, and declaring that solutions to the noise problem
must meet the needs of a particular airport environment, the FAA declined to estab-
lish a completely generalized policy. Id.
62. Id. at 50. Proprietors were saddled with this responsibility on the basis of
their proximity to the noise problem and intimacy with local conditions and require-
ments. The FAA noted that many airport proprietors are public agencies with access
to the machinery of local government. They are thus in an ideal position to imple-
ment their decisions. Id.
The FAA policy statement enumerated specific actions available to the airport pro-
prietor. These included, but by implication were not restricted to: optimal site loca-
tion, innovations in airport design, ground noise reduction measures, property
acquisition, and restrictions on airport use that are non-discriminatory and neither
obstruct the federal interests in air safety nor unreasonably interfere with interstate
commerce. Id. at 5.
63. When the FAA established its rules governing SST's, the agency reiterated its
position. The FAA stressed that proprietors had the legal authority to restrict the use
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expansive interpretation of the proprietor's role, consistent with the
FAA policy. Unlike other tribunals that have adjudicated similar
disputes," the Greater Westchester court focused on the planning and
operation of the airport in question.65 The court established a two-
pronged analytical framework for assessing a municipal proprietor's
power and liability.66 The two prongs are: 1) the depth and nature
of the city's involvement in the planning and operation of the airport,
and 2) the means available to the city to minimize or alleviate noise
damages.67
As to the first factor, the court related that it was the city's decision
to build, and later expand, the airport in the immediate vicinity of a
residential area.68 Furthermore, the city chose the location and di-
rection of the runways and agreed to their usage by jet aircraft.69
Although some of these plans involved federal cooperation, the city
initiated implementation of the plans.70 Turning to the second fac-
tor,7' the court noted that the airport possessed the statutory power to
condemn aircraft noise easements,72 a power openly acknowledged
of their airports, provided their actions were non-discriminatory and not violative of
the commerce clause. 43 Fed. Reg. 28406 (1978).
Congress reaffirmed its approval of this position when it enacted the Airline Der-
egulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1708 (pertinent portions codified at 49
U.S.C. § 1305 (1980)). Congress preempted state and local agencies from establishing
or enforcing regulations regarding rates, routes, and services of federally certified car-
riers. However, the Act expressly provided that it did not affect the powers of local
governments to act in their capacity as airport proprietors. 49 U.S.C. § 1305(b)
(1980).
64. E.g., Luedtke v. County of Milwaukee, 521 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1975) (see note
43 and accompanying text supra); San Diego Unified Port District v. Superior Court,
67 Cal. App. 3d 361, 136 Cal. Rptr. 557 (1977) (see note 47 SUpra).
65. The cases cited at note 64 supra, for example, do not refer to the planning,
development, and operation of the specific airports in question. They rely solely on
an analysis of case law. The Greater Westchester court emphasized the particular
policy questions before it based on its analysis of the planning and operation of LAX.
66. Greater Westchester Homeowner's Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles, 26 Cal. 3d
86, 98-99, 603 P.2d 1329, 1335, 160 Cal. Rptr. 733, 738-39.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 98, 603 P.2d at 1335, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 738.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See note 67 and accompanying text supra.
72. 26 Cal. 3d at 99, 603 P.2d at 1335, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 739. California law specif-
ically grants airports the power to acquire easements through eminent domain. CAL.
CODE CIVIL PRO. § 1240.110(a) (Dering).
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by airport management.73 The court also found that additional noise
reduction alternatives were available to the city.7 4 Since the city met
this twofold test, the court rejected the city's argument that federal
law had divested it of all authority to reduce aircraft noise.75
Having established that federal preemption did not render the city
powerless in the battle against aviation noise, the court turned to the
plaintiffs' nuisance claim. Finding that the Federal Aviation Act ex-
pressly preserves common law remedies76 and is not designed to set-
tle disputes between property owners and airport proprietors,'" the
court ruled that preemption did not bar the plaintiffs' claim.78 The
court opined that recognition of a nuisance cause of action would
impose no greater burden on commerce and airport operations than
that already generated by existing inverse condemnation remedies.79
The Greater Westchester court referred only once to the condition
giving rise to the plaintiffs' nuisance claim, namely, the arrivals and
departures of jet aircraft at LAX. 80 By not using the term "aircraft in
flight"'8 to describe the nuisance condition, the court may have been
73. 26 Cal. 3d at 99, 603 P.2d at 1335, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 739. The city expanded its
airport by opening the north runway complex in 1968. In a contemporaneous letter to
the FAA, the General Manager of the Department of Airports expressly admitted that
it was the city's responsibility to acquire sufficient air easements to reduce the noise
problem. City of Los Angeles v. Japan Air Lines Co., Ltd., 41 Cal. App. 3d 416, 423-
24, 116 Cal. Rptr. 69, 74 (1974).
74. 26 Cal. 3d at 99, 603 P.2d at 1335, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 739. The court cited the
construction of ground barriers which deflect aircraft noise, and the soundproofing of
neighboring structures.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 100, 603 P.2d at 1336, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 739. The Federal Aviation Act
explicitly provides that it neither abridges nor alters common law and statutory reme-
dies. 49 U.S.C. § 1506 (1958). See, e.g., Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S.
290 (1976) (common law action for tort damages held not barred by federal preemp-
tion of the field of aviation).
77. The court's examination of the Act revealed nothing to suggest that the FAA
has the power to adjudicate disputes between airport proprietors and neighboring
property holders. 26 Cal. 3d at 100, 603 P.2d at 1336, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 739. More-
over, the FAA policy statement strongly intimates that injured property holders
should direct their complaints to the airport proprietor. See notes 59-62 and accom-
panying text supra.
78. 26 Cal. 3d at 100, 603 P.2d at 1336, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 739.
79. Id. See notes 6 and 9, and accompanying text supra.
80. 26 Cal. 3d at 91, 603 P.2d at 1330, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 734.
81. Courts commonly use the phrase "aircraft in flight" to define the area over
which federal control is exclusive. See, e.g., British Airways Bd. v. Port Auth. of
N.Y., 564 F.2d 1002, 1010 (2d Cir. 1977); Air. Transport Ass'n. of America v. Crotti,
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trying to distinguish the Crotti case.82 Nevertheless, Greater West-
chester tacitly overrules Crotti and its progeny83 by holding that
noise generated by the arrivals and departues of jet aircraft at LAX
may constitute a nuisance.
The ruling in Greater Westchester will not settle the debate regard-
ing the extent of proprietary power. By granting recovery for per-
sonal injuries in addition to property damage,84 the decision will no
doubt increase the volume of litigation in this area. Greater West-
chester's holding also suggests that the Burbank exception has en-
veloped the rule. 5 Perhaps all but two airports in the United States
may be subject to liability for failing to adopt noise control regula-
tions. 6 Greater Westchester's two-pronged standard 7 and clearly ar-
ticulated method of analysis should, however, provide substantial
guidance to courts faced with such disputes in the future.
Jeffrey E. Fine
389 F. Supp. 58, 65 (N.D. Cal. 1975); San Diego Unified Port District v. Superior
Court, 67 Cal. App. 3d 361, 373, 136 Cal. Rptr. 557, 564 (1977).
82. See notes 44-47 and accompanying text supra. The distinction, presumably, is
that arriving and departing airplanes are not "aircraft in ffight". Such a limited view
of the word "flight" seems illogical and impractical. The fact that aircraft in these
stages are subject to orders from federally regulated control towers underscores the
strained nature of this view. See Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 303
(1944) (Jackson, J., concurring).
83, See note 47 and accompanying text supra.
84 It may appear that permitting the plaintiffs to recover for personal injuries as
well as for property damage constitutes double recovery. The law in California is
settled, however, that damages recoverable for an invasion of property include not
only dimunition in market value, but also damages for resulting annoyance, inconve-
nience and discomfort. See City of San Jose v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 447, 525
P.2d 701, 115 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1974); Kornoffv. Kingsburg Cotton Oil Co., 45 Cal. 2d
265, 288 P.2d 507 (1955). The Restatement of Torts accepts this position. It provides
that a recovery for property damage may include diminution in market value of the
property, compensation for loss of use of the land, and damages for discomfort and
annoyance. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 929(1) (1977).
85. See notes 28-34 and accompanying text supra.
86. See note 40.
87. See notes 64-75 and accompanying text supra.
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